Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed prime minister of South Vietnam in June 1954, with the backing of Washington DC. Dissatisfaction with Diem’s leadership became evident just a year into his rule. Despite professing a commitment to democracy and reform, Diem used anti-democratic and authoritarian methods to consolidate his power and eliminate or marginalise his political opponents. Diem’s chief sponsor, the United States government, was well aware of his growing unpopularity. These briefing papers were prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the US National Security Council during the last years of Eisenhower‘s presidency. They suggest that Diem’s strong-arm rule and indifference to reform, along with the activities of his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, were playing into the hands of the Viet Cong:

NSC briefing, September 30th 1958

“Discontent in both official and private circles in South Vietnam with President Diem’s one-man rule is [a] growing threat to government stability.

Influential Vietnamese, who formerly supported Diem without question, are now increasingly critical of his refusal to delegate authority and broaden [the] base of government. These critics include cabinet members and even vice-president Nguyen Ngoc Tho. [The] majority remain faithful to Diem but feel his tight rein is seriously jeopardising the regime. Some have resigned out of frustration and disgust.

A major source of dissatisfaction is Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who heads the president’s tight circle of advisors and is widely feared and hated. Diem makes policy and runs government but has left political organisation to his brother…

There is also considerable apathy and resentment among Vietnamese populace due to Saigon’s preoccupation with internal security at the expense of economic progress, because of heavy-handed measures and venal and oppressive civil servants.

This situation plays into [the] hands of the Vietnamese Communists (Viet Cong) who appear to be stepping up their clandestine activities. In addition to increased terrorism, Viet Cong activities include a growing propaganda campaign to alienate [the] masses by depicting Diem as a puppet of the ‘colonialist’ American, successors of the hated French.”

NSC briefing, May 9th 1960

“The Diem regime in South Vietnam, in addition to facing a stiff challenge from resurgent Communist guerrilla forces, is also confronted with a crumbling of strength from with which is potentially more dangerous.

Criticism of President Diem’s authoritative, one-man rule is becoming more pronounced at all levels of the government, including even among the military. [One] common complaint is that Diem’s refusal to delegate authority beyond a tight circle of relatives and cronies has paralysed effective government, fostered favouritism and corruption, and facilitated Communist subversion…

Non-Communist opposition to Diem outside government circles – among intellectuals, labour leaders, etc. – is still uncoordinated but is becoming more outspoken. A warning flag is the [Caravelle manifesto] issued recently in Saigon by a nucleus group of old-time Vietnamese government officials and civil leaders, demanding liberalisation of the government and adoption of democratic practices…

Despite growing pressures for reforms, Diem will probably try to maintain [the] status quo. He insists exigencies of the times preclude more democratic practices. He thinks more in terms of bigger and better-equipped military forces to beat down the growing Communist threat than in basic political and economic reform measures.

Over the long run, the Communists stand to parlay internal weakness of the Diem regime into ever greater subversive gains.”