A US general on military tactics in Vietnam (1984)

General Bruce Palmer Jnr served in the upper echelons of the United States Army in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In his 1984 memoir, Palmer reflected on American military tactics in Vietnam:

“The most suitable tactical role for US forces seemed to be one of taking on the regular, so-called main force units of the enemy. Originally they were exclusively Viet Cong in make-up but eventually became predominantly North Vietnamese Army (NVA) as Viet Cong casualties mounted, the war escalated, and more and more NVA troops were sent south.

So the rub was bringing the enemy forces to battle, for they had no definite, recognisable or overt positions. They remained either ‘underground’ (often literally) within South Vietnamese borders, or back in base sanctuaries in Cambodia or Laos, going on the attack only when they so decided, seeking to surprise a preselected victim. Thus the enemy clearly had the initiative; and, given the way the United States had decided to fight the war in a passive defence of South Vietnam, American forces found themselves in the unenviable situation of having to react and dance to the enemy’s tune.

Our greatest battle successes occurred when the enemy chose to attack a US unit well dug in and prepared to defend its position. As enemy forces learned about the devastating impact of greatly superior US fire-power, both ground- and air-delivered, they became less inclined to attack an American unit unless they could hit one moving overland, surprise one unprepared, or ambush a unit making a helicopter air assault into a landing zone.

It was a tough, risky business, for our troops, moving into and searching a hostile area, were exposed to enemy ambush, mines, and booby traps. Frequently they suffered casualties without ever seeing or contacting the enemy. After our troops had stopped moving, usually before daylight ended, and had prepared their defensive positions for the night, they often hoped for an enemy attack and an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties. This technique had several significant weaknesses. For a good chance of success, it required—but did not always have—reasonably accurate intelligence about the enemy’s movements and likely tactical objectives. It also demanded flawless execution and imaginative measures that would deceive the enemy, but unfortunately, our air assault operations were often an open book.

Night operations were particularly difficult and exceedingly dangerous for American troops in Vietnam, but to preclude them by design was a self-imposed handicap that gave the enemy an uncontested advantage.”