Robert McNamara calls for more troops in Vietnam (1965)

In July 1965, memorandums from Defence Secretary Robert McNamara to President Lyndon Johnson recommended increasing the number of US troops in Vietnam to 175,000 by the end of 1965, with another 100,000 troops through 1966. In this memo, McNamara explains how they will be deployed:

“The forces will be used however they can be brought to bear most effectively. US ground forces will operate in coordination with South Vietnamese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will assist in providing security in neighbouring areas; they will augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of key logistic areas and population centres.

Also, in the initial phase they will maintain a small reserve-reaction force, conducting nuisance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening and securing selected lines of communication; as in-country ground strength increases to a level permitting extended US and third country offensive action, the forces will be available for more active combat missions, whenever the
Vietnamese government and General Westmoreland agree such active missions are needed.

The strategy for winning this stage of the war will be to take the offensive to take and hold the initiative. The concept of tactical operations will be … putting the [North Vietnamese] forces out of operation and destroying their morale. The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces, are to gain and hold the initiative keeping the enemy at a disadvantage, maintaining a tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance…

The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea anti-infiltration campaign and includes increased use of air in-country, including B-52s, night and day to harass VC in their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units, the South Vietnamese must re-institute the Program of Rural Reconstruction as an antidote to the continuing VC campaign of terror and subversion.

The ARVN [South Vietnamese army] overall is not capable of successfully resisting the VC initiatives without more active assistance from more US and third-country ground forces than those thus far committed. Without further outside help, the ARVN is faced with successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and population centres, particularly in the highlands, piecemeal destruction of ARVN units, attrition of ARVN will to fight, and loss of civilian confidence…

The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with China or the Soviet Union can be kept small. US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase; just how much cannot be predicted with confidence, but US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another will probably see the thing through, and the United States public will support the course of action because it is a sensible and courageous military-political program … likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.”