Report urging greater US involvement in Vietnam (1961)

In November 1961, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defence Secretary Robert McNamara handed President John F. Kennedy a report urging greater American involvement in Vietnam:

1. United States national interests in South Vietnam.
The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Vietnam to communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the communist bloc. The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of south-east Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty…

3. United States’ objectives in South Vietnam
The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism. The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Vietnam into a position to win its own war against the guerrillas. We must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time, we must recognise that it will probably not be possible for [South Vietnam] to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighbouring territory. We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to strike at the source of the aggression in North Vietnam.

In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence recommend that:

1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism and that, in doing so, we recognise that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective, our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)

2. The Department of Defence be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Vietnam under one or more of the following purposes:

a. Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend Vietnam and to boost South Vietnam morale.

b. Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Vietnam.

c. Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organised Communist military intervention.

3. We immediately undertake the following actions in support of the GVN…

d. Provide [South Vietnam] with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways…

e. Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system, beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the government and the armed forces, to the Central Intelligence Organisation.

f. Provide such new terms of reference, reorganisation and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States participation in the direction and control of [South Vietnam’s] military operations…