NSC memorandum on US policy on South Vietnam (1963)

The following National Security Council memorandum on South Vietnam was drafted and endorsed on November 21st 1963, the day before the assassination of John F. Kennedy:

TOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:

1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy…

2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of US military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2nd 1963.

3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself in holding and developing increased public support. All US officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.

4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to ensure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government, both here and in the field…

5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational efforts. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but also of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land but the productivity of this area whenever the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces…

6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem government…

7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam [South Vietnam] resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action…

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometres inside Laos, together with political plans for minimising the international hazards of such an enterprise…

9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favourable influence upon that country…

10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels…