In November 1961 US General Maxwell Taylor provided the Kennedy administration with a report on his visit to South Vietnam. In this report he made the following recommendations:
“Following are the specific categories where the introduction of US working advisors or working military units are suggested…
A high-level government advisor or advisors. General Lansdale has been requested by Diem, and it may be wise to envisage a limited number of Americans – acceptable to Diem as well as to us – in key ministries…
A Joint US-Vietnamese military survey, down to the provincial level, in each of three corps areas, to make recommendations with respect to intelligence, command and control, more economical and effective passive defence, the build-up of a reserve for offensive purposes, military-province-chief relations, etc.
Joint planning of offensive operations, including border control operations…
Intimate liaison with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organisations (CIO)…
Counter infiltration operations in Laos…
Increased covert offensive operations in North as well as in Laos and South Vietnam…
The introduction, under MAAG operational control, of three helicopter squadrons – one for each corps area – and the provision of more light aircraft, as the need may be established…
A radical increase in US trainers at every level – from the staff colleges, where teachers are short, to the Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps, where a sharp expansion in competence may prove the key to mobilising a reserve for offensive operations…
The introduction of engineering and logistical elements within the proposed US military task force to work in the flood area within the Vietnamese plan, on both emergency and longer-term reconstruction tasks…
A radical increase in US special force teams in Vietnam – to work with the Vietnamese Ranger Force proposed for the border area [and] to assist in unit training, including training of Clandestine Action Service…
Increase the MAAG support for the Vietnamese Navy…
Introduction of US Naval and/or Coast Guard personnel, to assist in coastal and river surveillance and control until Vietnamese naval capabilities can be improved…
Reconsideration of the role of air power, leading to more effective utilisation of assets now available…
To execute this program of limited partnership requires a change in the charter, the spirit, and the organisation of MAAG in South Vietnam. It must be shifted from an advisory group to something nearer… an operational headquarters in a theatre of war… The US should become a limited partner in the war, avoiding formalised advice on the one hand, trying to run the war on the other…
Among the many consequences of this shift would be the rapid build-up of an intelligence capability, both to identify operational targets for the Vietnamese and to assist Washington in making a sensitive and reliable assessment of the progress of the war… In Washington, as well, intelligence and backup operations must be put on a quasi-wartime footing…”