The temporary concession of the October Manifesto did not alone quell the revolutionary spirit of 1905. The liberals and the middle-class were appeased but the workers and peasants continued to rage. Enter newly appointed chief minister Peter Stolypin, who acted decisively to calm things. Stolypin sent in troops to crush the urban Soviet and used his legislative power to establish a series of military tribunals to charge, try and execute parties guilty of revolutionary conduct (trials and executions were often carried out on the same day). The hangman’s noose became known as ‘Stolypin’s necktie’, so significant was the increase in executions. These steps calmed the urban strikers and forced many of the hardline revolutionaries into exile, however they did not solve the problems of peasant dissatisfaction or the long-standing need to modernise Russia’s economy.

Russia’s ‘agrarian problem’ had haunted its tsars and ministers for centuries. Russia’s 100 million-plus peasants were set in their ways, resistant to change and clung to antiquated farming methods that were labour intensive. Their backward agrarian organisation and techniques meant inefficient production and frequent food shortages. Yet stimulating modernisation was not just a matter of imposing policy: upsetting or threatening the peasantry posed obvious risks for the tsarist regime. Stolypin’s plan for economic reform was one of gradual change and encouragement; he aimed to capitalise the economy by assisting and empowering hard-working peasants, “wager on the strong” he called this. Assistance would be given to these farmers, in the form of banking facilities, loans and assistance for purchasing machinery or livestock. A “land bank” was also established to ensure fair and efficient redistribution of land (Stolypin wanted land ownership to be private, not communal … wealthier peasants were encouraged to obtain small, scattered plots of land and consolidate them into larger farms). Not only would this lead to economic improvements, it would also greatly expand the number of wealthier peasants (kulaks) who, grateful for the assistance given them, would remain conservative and loyal to the tsar.

Despite their attractiveness to some peasants, Stolypin’s reforms also encountered significant resistance. Much of this came from the communes, which were not just economic units for land ownership, they also constituted ‘community’ or even ‘family’ for many individuals. Peasants who took up the government and accepted loans or assistance were often isolated and harassed by those who remained in the mir. Bureaucrats who moved into villages, attempting to convince peasants to abandon strip farming, were often shown the door. Indeed the whole government effort to implement Stolypin’s changes was an enormous undertaking. The reforms did have some effect, though this was slow and barely noticeable after a decade. Between 1906 and 1915, when the reforms officially ended, the total land owned by the peasantry had increased from 4320 million to 4590 million acres, whereas the tsar’s own land-holdings remained the same. By 1915 more than half the peasants remained in communal land-ownership and only about 15 percent could be classed as kulaks. Stolypin himself had died in 1911, the victim of an assassin’s bullet, but his vision was only ever realised to a minor extent.