Assessment of Northern Ireland paramilitary groups (2015)

In 2015 the British government ordered an investigation into the status of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary groups. This assessment was carried out by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and MI5 and handed down in October of that year:

“This report concludes that:

i. All the main paramilitary groups operating during the period of the Troubles remain in existence. This includes the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Red Hand Commando (RHC), Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Seventeen years after the 1998 Belfast Agreement paramilitary groups remain a feature of life in Northern Ireland. The UDA, UVF and INLA have continued to recruit and all of the paramilitary groups maintain a relatively public profile, in spite of being illegal organisations.

ii. However the most serious current terrorist threat in Northern Ireland is not posed by these groups but by dissident Republicans – paramilitary groups not on ceasefire and who reject the 1998 Belfast Agreement… In addition to numerous paramilitary-style assaults, dissident Republicans have mounted between 15 and 40 terrorist attacks each year since 2000, which are primarily directed against PSNI officers. Their activities pose a severe threat to Northern Ireland’s security and stability and, at any given time, a terrorist attack is highly likely. There is also a smaller threat posed by dissident Loyalist paramilitary groups…

The majority of paramilitary groups in this report still have leadership structures and subgroups across NI. These groups still organise themselves along militaristic lines and use labels familiar from the Troubles e.g. ‘brigades’ or ‘army council’. These labels make the groups look more prepared for a campaign of violence than they are. Even in the highly unlikely event that the groups were minded to return to terrorism, we judge they would be unable to resurrect the capability demonstrated at their peak.

iv. There are differing levels of cohesion in the structures of these groups. However, none of the leaderships has complete control over the activities of its members; there is regular unsanctioned activity including behaviour in direct contravention of leadership instruction.

v. None of these groups is planning or conducting terrorist attacks. Members of the UDA and UVF have been directed towards community engagement including conflict resolution initiatives. Members of Provisional IRA have been directed to become involved in the politics of the Provisional movement. Most have nothing to do with dissident paramilitary groups. However, some INLA members have provided support to dissident Republicans.

vi. Members of these paramilitary groups continue to engage in violent activity, both directed by local leadership and conducted without sanction. Violence and intimidation are used to exercise control at a community level. The scale has vastly reduced from the period of the Troubles but still includes paramilitary-style assaults and, on occasion, murders; members of all groups have carried out murders since the 1998 Belfast Agreement…

viii. It is our firm assessment that, to different degrees, the leaderships of the main paramilitary groups are committed to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives.

ix. The existence and cohesion of these paramilitary groups since their ceasefires has played an important role in enabling the transition from extreme violence to political progress. Much of the leaderships’ ability to influence, restrain and manage the expectations of its members draws on the authority conferred through these hierarchies.”