On October 16th 1962 United States president John F. Kennedy was informed that U-2 flights had detected evidence of Soviet ballistic missiles being installed in Cuba. In this conversation from October 16th, transcribed from audio tapes, Kennedy and his advisors discuss a course of action with regard to the missiles in Cuba. Speakers include Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defence Secretary Robert McNamara:

General Marshall Carter: “It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be operational within two weeks as we look at the pictures now. And once operational, uh, they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of from four to six hours over each launcher.”

John F. Kennedy: “What about the vulnerability of such a missile to bullets?”

Unknown: “Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.”

Carter: “Uh, they’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire. We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been observing an unusual facility which now has automatic anti-aircraft weapon protection…

Kennedy: “Uh, General, how long would you say we had before these – at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know – will be ready to fire?”

Carter: “Well, our people estimate that these could be fully operational within two weeks. This would be the total complex. If they’re the oxygen type… it would be considerably longer since we don’t have any indication of, uh, oxygen refuelling there nor any radars”…

McGeorge Bundy: “How do we really know what these missiles are and what their range is?”

Carter: “Only that from the read-out that we have now and in the judgment of our analysts and of the guided missile and astronautics committee, which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union and have fully verified”…

Dean Rusk: “The disadvantage [of a warning to Castro] is, of course, the the advance notice if he judges that we, we would not in this, in such approach here say exactly what we would do, but it might lead him to bring up mobile anti-aircraft weapons around these, uh, missiles themselves, or take some other action that will make the strike that more difficult”…

Rusk: “There are two other problems that we are concerned about. If we strike these missiles, we would expect, I think, maximum Communist reaction in Latin America… One or another of those governments could easily be overthrown… The other is the NATO problem. We would estimate that the Soviets would almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere. For us to take an action of this sort without letting our closer allies know of a matter which could subject them to very great danger, is a very far-reaching decision to make. And we could find ourselves isolated and the alliance crumbling”…

Kennedy: “Can we get a little idea about what the military thing is? Well, of course, one, would you suggest taking these out?”

Robert McNamara: “Yes, Mr. President. General Taylor has just been with the Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this in detail. To take out only the missiles, or to take out the missiles and the MIG aircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities if we locate them, could be done in 24 hours’ warning… The Chiefs are strong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believing that it would leave too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The specific number of sorties required to accomplish this end has not been worked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of seven hundred sorties per day. It seems highly unlikely that that number would be required to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capability is available in the air force alone, and the navy sorties would rise on top of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternatives extending into the full invasion, uh, you may wish to discuss later. But that’s the answer to your first question.”

Kennedy: “That would be taking out these three missile sites, plus all the MIGs?”

McNamara: “Well, you can go from the three missile sites to the three missile sites plus the MIGs, to the three missile sites plus MIGs plus nuclear storage plus airfields and so on up through the offensive”…