Historian: Ernest May

ernest mayName: Ernest May

Lived: 1928-2009

Nationality: American

Profession(s): Historian, academic, author

Books: ‘Lessons’ of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (1973), Imperial Democracy: the Emergence of America as a Great Power (1973), The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 (1975), Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision-Makers (co-author, 1986), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (ed., 1997)

Perspective: Post-revisionist

Ernest May was an American historian and academic, best known for his long-serving tenure at Harvard and his focus on American foreign policy and international affairs.

May was born in Fort Worth, Texas and educated at the University of California. After completing his doctorate in 1951 he joined the United States Navy, working as a historical advisor and strategist. May left the Navy in 1954 and joined the staff of Harvard. He remained there for 55 years, working initially in the history department before transferring to the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

May was a popular but rigorous lecturer, known for his eloquence, his encyclopedic knowledge and his high expectations of students. His work also extended beyond academia. During the Cold War, May also worked for the US government preparing a confidential study of strategic arms buildups. He later served as an advisor to the 9/11 Commission.

May’s research was focused firmly on policy, particularly the formulation of foreign policy and the dynamics of international affairs. His approach was more analytical, more concerned with factors and conditions, and less inclined to lay blame.

Historiographically, May falls firmly in the Post-Revisionist school pioneered by John Lewis Gaddis. May’s explanations of the origins of the Cold War were balanced but strongly determinist. He considered the conflict inevitable, writing in 1984 that the US and USSR “were doomed to be antagonists” due to their “traditions [and] belief systems” as well as “propinquity and convenience”.

In May’s view, the early Soviet Union was ruled by a paranoid leader who saw expansion into eastern Europe as a necessity for survival. The United States government responded to this by focussing on military strength and adopting a foreign policy based on containment and the nuclear deterrent.

Quotations

“There probably was never any real possibility that the post-1945 relationship [between the United States and the Soviet Union] could be anything but hostility verging on conflict… Traditions, belief systems, propinquity and convenience… all combined to stimulate antagonism, and almost no factor operated in either country to hold it back.”

“For Americans, the Cold War always had Berlin at its centre. Without the continuing commitment to West Berlin, their experience of those decades could have been different… At the end of World War II, Americans were determined to dictate the peace from Berlin, capital of the despised adversary. To believed it had been a mistake not to have done so in World War I.”

“Knowing something of the brutal despoilation in Soviet occupation zones, American and British authorities hoped to set a different example in theirs. The twin motives of holding off the Soviets and providing concrete evidence of differences in values worked especially strongly in Berlin, where the Soviet and Western approaches were on daily display.”

“For the first five years after World War II, the new American government looked as if it would concentrate on the international economy… Not until 1949 did the government become one organised primarily to cope with supposed military threats. The most important factors accounting for this shift were evidence of a Soviet military buildup, the 1948 US election, McCarthyism, the Truman-MacArthur confrontation and, above all, nuclear weapons.”

“Estimates of Soviet military forces seemed later to have been too high. Scholars have charged that the American military deliberately exaggerated Soviet capabilities so as to improve chances of getting money. These charges do not withstand scrutiny. The estimates faithfully reflected the evidence sent to Washington from the field. What seems most likely is that the Soviets planted some of this evidence, hoping thereby to deter or intimidate Western nations.”

“McCarthyism accelerated [anti-communist attitudes] and made them harder to reverse. Many prominent figures who had earlier shown sympathy or even tolerance for Communists suffered harassment, often with front-page publicity. This made it difficult for anyone in public life to question the need for a virtual state of war. To do so involved risk of being labelled ‘soft’ or even ‘pink’.”

“The [US government] of the 1930s could not have survived World War II. Most Americans took from that war the lesson that the United States should not again be isolationist. Hence, the post-war State Department was bound to be a busier organisation. Many Americans also took from the war the lesson that military unpreparedness was dangerous. Hence, there was likely to be a larger military establishment, differently organised… And there had to be new machinery to govern nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.”

“The militarisation of the American government during the Cold War can be seen as a creative response to a challenge. Given Soviet militarism, insecurities in so many countries, and dizzying developments in nuclear and other military technologies, the world might have been much worse off if the United States had not organised itself to deal primarily with military issues. The fact it was so organised may have made a contribution to international stability, rivalling the contribution of nuclear weapons themselves.”


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