It is not unreasonable to suggest that America did not so much win the war as allow Britain to lose it. Facing an expensive conflict on a distant continent, British leaders hoped for a short war that would prove another drain on national finances. The tactics employed by Washington and other generals, however, created a situation where neither side was capable of forcing an outcome.

As time dragged on and the Continental Army either survived major battles or avoided them, British military commanders faced a strategic dilemma. What were they in America to do? How were they expected to subjugate an entire nation, a large proportion of whom were against them? How could they defeat an army that would not fight on their terms? If they could not control cities politically, were they there to destroy them? The British had no clear military objectives and lacked inventive generals to come up with ideas and tactics.

Much historical debate hinges on Washington’s role as general. Was he a great military commander or merely a trusty and stable leader? Washington lost six out of nine pitched battles he fought against the British, hardly a compelling record. One of his successes, the famous victory at Trenton in December 1776, was an ambush attack against some unprepared and hungover Hessian mercenaries.

Nevertheless, Washington did what needed to be done. As one historian put it, he only needed to be better than the generals he opposed.

Although of great aggressive instinct, after the early defeats of 1775-76, Washington realised the success of the revolution was closely linked to the survival of the Continental Army. From that point, his tactics focused on small-scale battles, skirmishes and ambushes followed by retreat and regrouping. European-style field battles, which risked the destruction and capture of the Continental Army, must be avoided, at least initially.

By 1779, Washington’s soldiers possessed of more combat experience and enough military discipline to engage in pitched battles against the English and their mercenary allies. With French troops also on their way to America, Washington felt more comfortable in launching aggressive assaults.

“We are far from an anticipated peace because the bitterness of the rebels is too wide-spread, and in regions where we are masters, the rebellious spirit is still in them. The land is too large, and there are too many people. The more land we win, the weaker our army gets in the field. It would be best to come to an agreement with them.”
von Lossberg, Hessian general

France’s involvement in the Revolutionary War was a significant factor in the American victory. This was not just because of the French infantry and artillery (though that was important enough) but also the tactical advantage offered by the French navy.

The naval strength of the British had allowed them to maintain supplies, munitions and reinforcements wherever their ground forces went. As long as British units remained relatively close to the coast, their supply lines remained intact. The Continental Army, however, relied on requisitioning and foraging, both inconsistent for producing what they needed.

The Americans did have their own Continental Navy but it was small and ill equipped to do battle with England’s gunships. Most American naval activity focused on privateering, or state-sanctioned piracy and seizure of British merchant ships. American privateers were very active around the British Isles, capturing an estimated 1,500 ships and 12,000 sailors by the end of the Revolutionary War. The most famous American naval victory of the war was John Paul Jones’ battle with British frigates in August 1779.

It is often said that the Continental Army’s encampment at Valley Forge was a turning point in the war, though it involved the disastrous loss of up to 2,000 soldiers through cold, disease and malnutrition. Valley Forge came at a low period in the army’s fortunes. It followed a series of costly and embarrassing defeats, plummeting enlistments and public criticisms of Washington. Support from Congress was sporadic at best and desertions were increasing.

The encampment at Valley Forge might have been costly in human terms but it did allow a breathing spell for the army and the chance for further training. A Prussian officer acting as an advisor to Washington, Baron von Steuben, gave the soldiers critical training in military tactics, maneuvers and the use and firing of their weapons. Their improved performance was noted in the first significant battle following Valley Forge, the Battle of Monmouth.

The Continental Army emerged from their Valley Forge ordeal both hardened and unified by the atrocious conditions they had to endure, and better skilled in warfare, thanks to von Steuben’s training.

The arrival of French forces in 1779 was also coupled with deteriorating British morale and, back in London, a declining interest in prolonging the war. When a joint action involving American and French infantry and the French navy laid siege to British troops in Yorktown in 1781, forcing their commander Lord Cornwallis to surrender, it proved the last straw for Parliament, which initiated peace negotiations. The more level-headed MPs speculated that it was a war that England was never able to win, and they were perhaps correct: fighting on foreign soil to achieve political obedience was, in hindsight, an unachievable goal.

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